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Abstract— An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is one of the 
widely used tools for defending computer networks. Its main goal 
is to classify activities into two major categories: (1) normal 
activities and (2) intrusive activities. Both types of activities are 
hard to predict as the boundaries cannot be well defined and a 
prediction process may generate false alarms. Many anomaly- 
based intrusion detection systems have experienced this. 
However, with fuzzy logic, the false alarm rate in determining 
intrusive activities can be reduced. This paper proposes a One-
rule Genetic-Fuzzy classifier system to generate the fuzzy rules 
that are capable of detecting intrusive activities by using Genetic 
Algorithms (GA). GA is now a viable alternative for the detection 
of malicious intrusions. They tune the fuzzy membership 
functions and select an appropriate set of features. After that 
they generate a proper discrimination rule. Typically, a set of 
fuzzy rules (fuzzy classifiers) is used to define the normal and 
abnormal behavior in a computer network. The main goal of this 
work is to (1) evolve comprehensible rule(s) that improves the 
classification rate, (2) produce shorter rules, and (3) perform 
automatic feature selection according to the complexity of data.  
The proposed system combines both anomaly-based intrusion 
detection and misuse detection. A series of experimental results on 
the well-known KDD Cup 1999 data set [12] demonstrate that the 
proposed method is feasible. In the paper a performance of the 
evolved fuzzy classifiers with a classification accuracy of 92% is 
presented. 
Keywords-Intrusion detection; Genetic algorithms; Fuzzy Logic 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
An intrusion can be defined as ‘‘an act of a person or proxy 
attempting to break into or misuse a system in violation of an 
established policy’’ [1]. So, to protect systems from intruders, 
an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is needed. It is a 
combination of software and hardware for monitoring and 
detecting (1) data traffic and (2) user behavior. IDS is used to 
identify attempts of illegitimately accessing or manipulating a 
system which can be done by malware and/or human intruders 
(crackers, or disgruntled employees).  
The main problem to solve is the difficulty of 
distinguishing between normal behavior and abnormal 
behavior in computer networks. Here, the big challenge is the 
significant overlap in data from both types. When trying to 
detect an Intrusion in a system based on the Anomaly Intrusion 
Detection, frequently a False Alarm is generated. How to solve 
this problem? 
The past few years have witnessed a rapid growth in the 
number and variety of applications of fuzzy logic. Fuzzy logic, 
as a robust soft computing method, has demonstrated its ability 
in IDS [2-7]. The use of fuzzy logic might reduce the amount 
of false alarms. Here, it is important to study the features of the 
process for separation of the overlap between normal and 
abnormal activities. Fuzzy systems have several important 
features which make them suitable for IDS [4]. Most fuzzy 
systems make use of human expert knowledge to create their 
own fuzzy rule base. Hence, the rule base lacks adaptation. 
Therefore, building fuzzy systems with learning and adaptation 
capabilities has received much attention since 2007 [7].  
Various methods have been suggested for automatic 
generation and adjustment of fuzzy rules without using the aid 
of human experts; the Genetic-Fuzzy System (GFS) is one of 
the most successful approaches in this regard [7-9]. 
A GFS is basically a fuzzy system augmented by a learning 
process based on a Genetic Algorithm (GA). Nowadays, we 
may consider it a viable alternative for the detection of 
malicious intrusions [10-11]. 
Our system is based on this idea. It is implemented as 
follows. The GA was run over a subset of the data, called the 
training data, and then tested using one rule over the entire data 
set to test the real-world performance. The task was to predict 
the value of each activity (normal or intrusive) for each element 
out of the dataset containing 311,029 activities.  
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. Sections 2 and 
3 illustrate the used dataset and the preprocessing data stage. 
The fuzzy logic used is pointed out in Section 4. The developed 
GA including the used coding scheme, fitness function, 
crossover, and mutation are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 
illustrates the One-Rule Genetic-Fuzzy classifier system. 
Evaluation and testing of the developed software protection 
system is presented in Section 7. The conclusion of this paper 
will be found in Section 8. 
II. DATA SETS 
To evaluate the performance of the proposed IDS, a series 
of experiments on KDD CUP 1999 ((Knowledge Discovery in 
Database) dataset was conducted. This dataset is a version of 
the original 1998 DARPA intrusion detection evaluation 
program, which is prepared and managed by the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology’s (MIT) Lincoln Laboratory [12].An 
environment was set up to acquire raw TCP/IP dump data for a 
network by simulating a typical US air force LAN. The LAN 
was operated like a real environment, but being blasted with 
multiple attacks. For each TCP/IP connection, 41 various 
quantitative and qualitative features were extracted. The dataset 
contains 311,029 activity records.  
___________________________________ 
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III. PREPROCESING  DATASET 
The original data set used in the work includes symbolic 
attributes and numerical attributes. At the beginning the 
symbolic attributes must be converted to a numerical form. So, 
all the data become numerical. 
Two preprocessing steps have been applied to the original 
data set used in the work: Uniform distribution by pattern class 
and normalization of numerical attributes.  
The Uniform distribution process divides the dataset into 10 
sets, each set contains 31,102 records generated randomly from 
the original data set with the following property: If the sample 
number of pattern class k is m and the original data set has 
n samples, then the probability to find a sample of class k in 
the first n/m samples of the final data set is 1.0. Therefore, 
each portion of the final data set has almost the same 
distribution of the full data set.  
The selected dataset is normalized: Each numerical 
attribute in the data set is normalized between 0.0 and 1.0 
according to (1): 
 
In which, x is the actual numerical attribute value, y is the 
numerical value at which 0y1, Min is the minimum value for 
the attribute that x belongs to, and Max is the maximum value 
for the attribute that x belongs to [2].  
IV. FUZZY LOGIC 
Fuzzy Logic is a form of many-valued logic; it deals with 
reasoning that is approximate rather than fixed and exact. In 
contrast with traditional logic theory (crisp), where binary sets 
have two-valued logic: true or false, fuzzy logic variables may 
have a truth value that ranges in degree between 0 and 1. Fuzzy 
logic has been extended to handle the concept of partial truth, 
where the truth value may range between completely true and 
completely false. 
In fuzzy logic, fuzzy sets define the linguistic notions, and 
membership functions define the truth-value of such linguistic 
expressions [13].  
The membership degree to a fuzzy set of an object defines a 
function where the universe of discourse (set of values that the 
object can take) is domain, and the interval [0, 1] is the range. 
That function is called the membership function. “Fig.1” shows 
the used membership function, i.e., the triangular membership 
function. A collection of fuzzy sets, called fuzzy space, defines 







Figure 1: Membership function & Fuzzy space for numerical attributes in 
the KDD-cup99 data set 
With fuzzy spaces, fuzzy logic allows an object to belong to 
different classes at the same time. The fuzzy space used for 
each numerical attribute is assigned as illustrated in “Fig.1”. 
For non-numerical attributes the categorical values are used as 
crisp sets (fuzzy sets that does not overlapping each other). 
Therefore, a value of false for this attribute has a degree of 
membership to the crisp set FALSE equal to 1.0 and degree of 
membership to the fuzzy set TRUE equal to zero. 
Fuzzy rules have the form: 
IF condition THEN consequent  
Where, 
• Condition is a complex fuzzy expression, i.e., it uses 
fuzzy logic operators and atomic fuzzy expressions 
• Consequent is an atomic expression. 
V. GENETIC ALGORITHM 
A GA is the computational equivalent of the natural 
evolutionary process. In a GA, a set of chromosomes 
(population) is generated, each chromosome codifying a 
possible solution for the given problem, is evolved using a set 
of genetic operators (mutation, crossover, selection). Each 
chromosome has a probability to be used by one or more of 
the genetic operators, and this probability depends on the 
adaptability of the chromosome (efficiency of the organism to 
solve the given problem). 
A. Chromosome Encoding (Rule Representation) 
The encoding schema used in this paper is Direct value 
encoding. In value encoding, every chromosome is a string of 
some values. Values can be anything connected to problem, 
integer numbers, real numbers or characters to some 
complicated objects. Since there are different GA for each 
class, the action part does not need to be represented as part of 
the rule in the chromosome. It only represents the condition 
part. Formally, a condition is generated by the following 
grammars: 
(1) <condition> ::= < atomic_cond > <operator><condition>|< 
atomic_cond ><operator>< atomic_cond > 
(2) <atomic_cond> ::= <variable> <rel op> <set> 
(3) <operator> ::= ∧ <prec> | ∨ <prec> 
(4) <variable> ::= x1|…|xn 
(5) <rel op> ::=  ∈ | ∉  
(6) <set> ::= L | ML | M | MH | H 
(7) <prec> ::= 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 
 
In this work, precedence values for each operator in the 
representation itself (represented by <prec> in the grammar) 
is introduced. This precedence value indicates the order of 
evaluation. An operator with a higher precedence value is 
evaluated first. 
The chromosome is defined as a set of n genes. An atomic 
condition and a fuzzy operator compose a gene, as is shown in 
“Fig.2”. However, there is an exception in the last gene, which 
is composed of an atomic condition only, while the last part 





























































Figure 2. Chromosome representation of the condition for n (0...39) gene 
In this work, each chromosome is a structure record of 
length >2 and <=41 Gene (q-array), each containing the 
following fields: 
• atomic condition part: 
o attribute number : the attribute number which may be between 
(0..40) created randomly; 
o var : the attribute value; 
o ro: relational operation which may be (∈ ,∉) created randomly; 
o set: fuzzy set (created randomly ) which may be: 
 For the numerical fields one of the following sets: 
1. low=[0.0,0.333] 
2. Medium Low=[0.166,0.5] 
3. Medium=[0.333,0.666] 
4. Medium High=[0.5,0.8] 
5. High=[0.666,1.0] 
and for non numerical fields the sets will be as follows: 
1. cr1=[0.0,0.5] 
2. cr2=(0.5,1.0] 
• operator part: 
o op: logical operation which may be (
∨∧,
) created randomly; 
o prec: is the number between (0..3) created randomly, it specifies 
the precedence of evaluating the logical operation between the 
genes. 
An important characteristic of this representation is that, in 
order to express the genotype, the operator precedence parser 
[14] algorithm is used. This technique allows the evaluation of 
an expression in a very efficient way. The chromosome only 
has to be traversed once, that is, the time complexity of the 
evaluation is O(n), where n is the condition expression length. 
B. Population Generation 
A GA starts with a population of randomly generated 
chromosomes, and advances towards better chromosomes by 
applying genetic operators modeled on the genetic processes 
occurring in nature. 
In this step a set of n chromosomes (rule) is randomly 
generated, consisting of n genes, each of which contains fields 
described earlier. 
C. Fitness Evaluation 
The GA processes populations of chromosomes, 
successively replacing one such population with another 
depending on the fitness function. A fitness function assigns a 
score to each chromosome in the current population. The 
fitness of a chromosome depends on how well that 
chromosome solves the problem at hand.  
Before defining the fitness function, it is necessary to see 
table 1 to recall the concepts on classification rule evaluation 
concerning normal and attack activities [15]. 
TABLE 1.CLASSIFICATION RULE EVALUATION 
Result types Prediction actual 
True Positive (TP) normal normal 
False Positive (FP) attack normal 
True Negative (TN) attack attack 
False Negative (FN) normal attack 
 
The fitness of each chromosome (rule) is evaluated with 
respect to a set of attribute vectors (training set) to which a 
class has been previously assigned. In each run of the GA, a 
rule with different class Ci is evolved. The fitness of a 









The description of the symbols is as follows. 
• TP, TN, FP, and FN are the true positive, true negative, 
false positive, and false negative values for the codified 
rule, respectively.  
• Predicted: is the fuzzy value of the condition part of the 
codified rule 
• p and q: are the number of normal and attack samples in 
the training data set used by each chromosome, 
respectively, 
• w1, w2, and w3: are the assigned weights for each rule 
characteristic, respectively; three strategies were tested to 
define the value of the fitness weights. The first strategy 
uses the constant values w1=0.45, w2=0.45, and w3=0.1. 
The second strategy assigns proportional random values 
to the weight in order to give more importance to the 
specificity and sensitivity terms, i.e., the weight w1, w2, 
and w3 are assigned random values such that w1 >4*w3 
and w2>4*w3. The third strategy assigns random values 
to each weight. In the second and third strategies, the 
weights are scaled such that the weights sum to one.  
•  normal_datai: is the subset of normal training patterns, 
and, 
• abnormal_datai: is the subset of attack training 
patterns. 
 
The set of equations to calculate the fitness for the 
abnormal class can be obtained by changing abnormal for 
normal in previous equations. Recall that each individual is 
associated with a fuzzy prediction value (i.e., fitness value), 
the best chromosome in the population (i.e., the chromosome 
with the fittest value) is chosen and the fuzzy rule is added to 
the fuzzy classifier.  
D. Three Genetic Operators 
A genetic operator is a process used in GAs to maintain 
genetic variation. Genetic variation is a necessity for the 
process of evolution. Genetic operators used in GAs are 
analogous to those which occur in the natural world: (1) 
survival of the fittest, or selection; (2) reproduction (crossover, 
also called recombination); and (3) mutation. 
(2) 
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When creating a new population by crossover and 
mutation, there is a big chance that the best chromosome will 
be lost. To prevent this we introduce Elitism [16]. Elitism is 
the name of a method, which first copies the best 
chromosome (or a few best chromosomes) to the new 
population. The rest is done in classical way. Next to elitism, 
we rely on Tournament selection in which a set r of 
chromosomes is chosen and compared, the best one being 
selected for parenthood [17]. 
When the crossover operator is applied, a crossover point 
is chosen. The number of genes in the chromosomes should be 
between two and the minimum length of the two parent 
chromosomes. The chromosome consists of set of genes at 
which each gene is represented as a record that contains a set 
of fields. Therefore, it is important to take into consideration 
that the crossover point represents the gene number as whole 
not any of its fields.  
After crossover, the offspring is subject to mutation, with 
probability pm. If an offspring is mutated it undergoes either 
"hoist" mutation or gene randomization with equal probability. 
Algorithm randomization involves completely randomizing a 
randomly selected gene of the mutant. Hoisting involves 
selecting a feature extraction algorithm from the mutant 
chromosome, selecting a random node from the algorithm's 
tree, and replacing it by one of the node's descendents. This is 
less destructive than the algorithm randomization because at 
least part of the algorithm is preserved.  
VI. ONE-RULE GENETIC-FUZZY CLASSIFIER SYSTEM 
Three types of training approaches were suggested in the 
training phase: General Data Splitting method(GDS), Data 
filtering Splitting method(DFS), and Feature Ranking(FR).  
In GDS the whole data set (311,029) is split into two 
classes (1) Normal activity records these are (60593) and (2) 
Attack activity records these are (250436). In DFS the whole 
data is divided into five classes (Normal data 60593, Probing 
attack 4166, Dos attack 229853, U2R attack 230, R2L attack 
16187). In FR ranks the importance of input features for each 
of the five classes of patterns in the DARPA . 
After training our system with one of the above training 
approches we obtain a rule with a number of features and a 
fitness value (see table 2).we repeated the training many times 
and took the most promissing results (see table 2). 
In the testing phase one of the rules generated from the 
training phase is used to classify the normality or abnormality 
of the pattern. 
The input to the classifier is the rule and the pattern to be 
classified. The process starts by fuzzifying the pattern 
according to the rule (see below), then calculating the 
predicted value (by the operator precedence parser [14]). The 
result is one value. According to that value and a specific 
threshold the decision can be made (the pattern is either 











Rule type No. of 
features 
Fitness 
R1 GDS Normal 3 0.823 
R2 GDS Attack 12 0.910274 
R3 GDS Normal 3 0.87703 
R4 GDS Attack 5 0.8872 
R5 GDS Normal 3 0.84258 
R6 GDS Attack 5 0.88037 
R7 GDS Normal 4 0.84313 
R8 GDS Attack 7 0.90126 
R9 DFS Normal 3 0.9267 
R10 DFS Attack Dos 11 0.90731 
R11 DFS Attack Dos 9 0.90913 
R12 DFS Normal 3 0.83969 
R13 DFS Attack U2R 3 0.81441 
R14 DFS Attack U2R 3 0.8144 
R15 DFS Normal 4 0.81721 
R16 DFS Attack Probe 7 0.76179 
R17 DFS Normal 3 0.75923 
R18 DFS Attack R2L 13 0.77429 
R19 FR Normal 25 0.59752 
R20 FR Attack Probe 7 0.64399 
R21 FR Attack Dos 20 0.6033 
R22 FR Attack R2L 6 0.60331 
















Figure 3. The flow graph of the One-Rule Classifier  
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
To study the behavior of the classifier, the whole data set is 
used for measuring the classification efficiency of the 





C: is the classification efficiency, 
S: is the number of correctly classified activities, 
T: is the total number of the activity records in the data set. 
The main classification idea used in this work depends on 
the generated rule and the threshold. Therefore it is very 
important to find out the proper threshold values (a threshold 
value for normal activities, a threshold value for the attack 
activities). Choosing the best threshold values can be done by a 
trial-error method. Table 3 illustrates that the best threshold 
value for a normal activity is 1.0 and table 4 illustrates that the 
best threshold value for the attack activity is 0.01. 
T
S
C = (3)  
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TABLE 3. THE RESULTS OF APPLYING THE BEST NORMAL RULE R3 
OVER THE WHOLE DATA SET WITH DIFFERENT THRESHOLD 
VALUES FOR NORMAL ACTIVITIES 
Threshold Correct Miss Correctness Error Rate 
1 253658 57371 0.815544531 0.184455469 
0.9 245171 65858 0.788257687 0.211742313 
0.8 245168 65861 0.788248041 0.211751959 
0.7 245027 66002 0.787794707 0.212205293 
0.6 245032 65997 0.787810783 0.212189217 
0.5 245034 65995 0.787817213 0.212182787 
0.4 245038 65991 0.787830074 0.212169926 
 
TABLE 4. THE RESULTS OF APPLYING THE BEST ATTACK RULE R2 
OVER THE WHOLE DATA SET WITH DIFFERENT THRESHOLD 
VALUES FOR ATTACK ACTIVITIES 
Threshold Correct Miss Correctness Error Rate 
0.5 271425 39604 0.872667822 0.127332178 
0.3 280234 30795 0.90098994 0.09901006 
0.2 281796 29233 0.90601198 0.09398802 
0.1 284310 26719 0.914094827 0.085905173 
0.03 285651 25378 0.918406322 0.081593678 
0.01 286876 24153 0.922344862 0.077655138 
0.009 286863 24166 0.922303065 0.077696935 
0.0085 286864 24165 0.92230628 0.07769372 
0.008 286858 24171 0.922286989 0.077713011 
0.001 286601 24428 0.9214607 0.0785393 
0 250436 60593 0.805185369 0.194814631 
The Correct field is calculated by adding the True-positive 
to the True-negative values for each rule, while the Miss field 
is calculated by adding the False-positive to the False-
negative for each rule. Finally, Correctness is calculated 
using (3), Error Rate field equals (1-correctness). 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Our main conclusion is that we were able to develop a 
system that was able to produce adequate detectors which 
provide a suitable estimation of the amount of deviation from 
the normal. So, it was possible to apply the classifiers to detect 
anomalies in real network traffic data. The accuracy of the 
One-Rule Classifier is 92.00% (see table 4). This is a good 
result and comparable to those reported in the literature. 
Moreover, the accuracy can be further improved by applying 
specific strategies. The success of GA shows that our method 
of model generation for IDS is a viable alternative. The GA 
successfully generated an individual model through 
randomized mutation. The model (generated by training data) 
was successful in applying its empirical knowledge to data not 
seen before. This supports the claim that the characteristics of 
malicious computer activities are inherently dissimilar to 
normal activities. Despite the fact that only five values for the 
linguistic variables (see “Fig.1”) were used, the accuracy of the 
generated classifier rules is trustworthy. During the training 
process it was found that changing the size of the normal 
training data set with respect to the size of the attack data set 
(same percentages of the two data set or different percentages) 
did not affect the obtained classification rule. Both anomaly 
detection and misuse detection were supported by this                                                                                                                                 
system. It provides the ability to respond to anomalies and not 
only to signatures of known attacks. The main contribution of 
the present work is (1) the design of a classification process for 
the intrusion detection problem; (2) the application of fuzzy 
logic and genetic algorithms, and (3) its performance of 92%. 
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